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ABSTRACT 
Drawing on the principal-agent branch of Agency Theory as a framework, this 
study explores the linkage between perceived environmental uncertainty (PEU), 
information asymmetry (IA) and superior's evaluation style (ES) and their joint 
effect on the design of executive's compensation scheme (CS). In particular, 
it explores the notion that the effects of the evaluation style adopted by the top 
management in the process of performance appraisal on manager's incentive 
schemes are dependent on both the level of information asymmetry within the 
organization and the level of perceived environmental uncertainty faced by the 
organization. 
The results of a field survey of 56 executives at middle-management level in 
four large state-owned enterprises in People's Republic of China shows that 
there is a significant three-way interaction effects of the perceived 
environmental uncertainty faced by the organization, the level of information 
asymmetry inside the organization, and the performance evaluation style 
adopted by the top management on the design of the compensation scheme 
of middle management. It is also found that for organizations operating in a 
very uncertain environment (as perceived by its middle-management) and with 
the information very asymmetrically distributed between middle management 
and top management, a subjective nonaccounting evaluation style will be 
connected with a high level of behaviour-based compensation scheme. 
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Agency relationship occurs whenever one or more individuals ( called 
Principals) hire others ( called agents) in order to delegate responsibilities to 
them. It is a term originated in legal discourse, but actually represents a 
pervasive facet of economic life. 
The most discussed branch of Agency Theory is the principal-agent model, 
which takes the organization of the firm (including the allocation of tasks and 
ownership rights ) as given and concentrates on the choice of the ex ante 
employment contract and information systems. 
The application of Agency Theory into managerial accounting research began 
in the early 1980s, which has, in the past decade, shed some light on some 
controversial areas of managerial accounting practices adopted by the real 
world organizations, by providing a unique perspective to interpret individual's 
behaviour within a multi-person organization. 
In the prinapa丨-agent mocfe丨,individuais are assumed to be rational and to have 
unlimited computational ability. Further, they can anticipate and assess the 
probability of all possible future contingencies. Each individual's actions are 
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endogenously derived，based on his well-specified preferences and beliefs, and 
each individual expects every other individual to act solely on the basis of his 
own preferences and beliefs. Finally, it is usually assumed that the agent is 
work-averse and risk averse [Baiman, 1990]. 
The agency relationship which management accounting researchers focus on 
exists between the top management and the middle management within an 
organization, with the top management as the principal delegate certain 
decision power and responsibilities to the middle management as the agent 
who in return get some reward for that responsibility. 
Monitoring problems arise when there exists hidden action and hidden 
information, both resulting from the principal hiring the agent to perform some 
duties but not being able to motivate the agent appropriately to perform those 
duties. 
The most typical hidden action is the effort of the agent. According to the 
assumptions, effort is a disutility to the agent, but it has a value to the principal 
in the sense that it increases the likelihood of a favourable outcome, so, when 
the principal is not able to observe the actual input supplied by the agent, 
mainly due to technical reasons, some surrogates may have to serve as the 
basis for contracting and that increases the agent's incentive to shirk and result 
in a loss of welfare for the principal. When hidden action exists, when 
motivational problems and conflicts arises as a result of basing contracts on 
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imperfect surrogates of behaviour, the problem of moral hazard is said to arise. 
When the agent has hidden information to which the principal can not costlessly 
gain access, the agent would use this private information to make action choice 
decisions in his own interest, while the principal is not able to check whether 
the agent has used his or her private information in the way that best serves 
the principal's interest. This situation is quite common in the agency 
relationship, when the agent possesses much better technical knowledge in his 
range of responsibility and in decentralized firms in which subordinates are 
better informed about the production environment or the marketing environment 
than are their supervisors. If the agent is motivated to mispresent his hidden 
information in order to successfully make a choice of action different from that 
desired by the principal, then the problem of adverse selection is said to arise. 
Both moral hazard and adverse selection are information-based problems. The 
agency relationship varies in the degree of informational asymmetry they 
involve. 
Being a standard and strict economic model, the agency theory is able to 
function both normatively and positively in the area of managerial accounting 
[Baiman, 1990]. It offers insights into the construction of employment contracts 
aiming at guiding and influencing principal-agent relations in the real world. 
Meanwhile, it also represents a rigorous attempt to explain observed 
phenomena in the empirical economic world. Normatively, agency theory 
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provides a model from which uses of managerial accounting information can be 
derived and studied, because in the principal-agent model, the firm's 
employment contracts are optimal functions of the information supplied by the 
firm's management accounting system. Positively, it provides a coherent and 
effective framework within which we can view managerial accounting 
procedures and pose managerial accounting questions. 
The agency theory literature has been for years concentrating on the 
relationship among the organization's information system, its employment 
contracts and the welfare of its members. A large strand of the application of 
the principal-agent model into management accounting research has been in 
the design of employment contracts to overcome agency problems. For 
example, attempts have been made to study how compensation plans will differ 
depending upon whether the problem to overcome is one of incentives versus 
one of learning the agent's type [Murphy, 1986] and to examine whether 
executive pay packages can be explained as attempts to reduce agency costs 
resulting from management having a shorter decision horizon [Lewellen et al” 
1987]. Wolfson [1985] further studies contracts in the oil and gas limited 
partnership market which enjoys substantial moral hazard. 
Criticism has been raised in questioning the ability of empirical research to test 
the results of agency analysis and to distinguish between the different demands 
for observed executive compensation contracts [Hagerty and Siegel, 1988; 
Amershi and Butterworth, 1988]. Observing the form of the contract only, 
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without any additional information, may not enable the observer to infer the 
economic environment which gives rise to the contract. An approach for future 
empirical validation of the agency model has been suggested by Baiman 
[1990】： 
“. . . to concentrate less on deriving optimal compensation contracts and 
concentrate more on more easily observed aspects of the firm." 
Answering to this call, this study aims at exploring the relationships between the 
actual design of compensation scheme (which is a major constituent of the 
design of employment contract) and one environmental variable ( PEU )’ one 
organizational variable ( IA ) and one control mechanism adopted by the top 
management ( ES), and their interactive effects. 
By exploring these relationships, I hope that this study makes a contribution to 
the growing body of literature on the application of principal-agent model into 
managerial accounting problems by focusing on three aspects. First, by 
conducting the field work at some state-owned enterprises at People's Republic 
of China, this study exposes a successful theoretical framework which derives 
from the western capitalist world to an oriental socialist setting which embraces 
totally different culture and ideology and hence, different management 
philosophy and practices. It is certainly a brave step in testing agency theory's 
unique perspective of interpreting human behaviour and organization in a more 
universal background. Second, it tests the model as a basis for a positive 
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theory of management accounting by examining the descriptive validity of 
agency theory in the context of compensation scheme design. Third, this study 
will have some practical implications for the design of managerial accounting 
control systems. By identifying the actual relationship among PEU, IA, ES and 
CS in some successfu丨 enterprises, top management may select appropriate 




DEVELOPMENT OF PROPOSITIONS 
Although the agency model assumes that all individuals (whether principals or 
agents) are motivated by self-interest, this does not preclude there being a 
common interest among the members of the organization. As Fama [1980] 
notes: 
“ In effect, the firm is viewed as a team of individuals whose members 
act from self-interest but realize that their destinies depend to some 
extent on the survival of the team in its competition with other teams." 
In this description of the firm, self-interest motivates each individual so that the 
potential for intra-firm conflict is recognized. However, since each individual's 
welfare is dependent upon the success of the firm, increased cooperation 
among the members of the firm might result in an increase in the welfare of 
some members without a decrease in the welfare of any of the others (i.e., in 
a Pareto improvement). The contractual relationships agreed upon by the 
members of the firm determine the extent to which self-interested and 
cooperative behaviour diverge, hence agency researchers focus on the design 
of optimal employment contracts to mitigate the divergence between the 
cooperative behaviour that will maximize the welfare of the individuals and the 
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self-interested behaviour that is achievable. 
One major element in such employment contract, which is the focus of this 
study, is the compensation contract. As an important control and motivation 
mechanism utilized by principals, compensation schemes are supposed to be 
designed for the purpose of reducing the divergence of interest between the 
middle management who follows its own self-interest and the top management 
who represents the firm's welfare. 
Demski and Feltham [1977] defines a budget-based payment schedule as one 
which satisfies three criteria: 
1. The worker's compensation is, in part, a function of some observable 
attribute(s) of the outcome resulting from his actions; 
2. The contract specifies a budgeted (standard) outcome (attribute) level 
that partitions the set of possible outcomes into favourable and 
unfavourable subsets; 
3. The worker's compensation function consists of two or more functions, 
one defined over the favourable subset and the other defined over the 
unfavourable subset. 
Based on agency theory, Demski and Feltham [1978] show that if employee 
skill or effort is costly to observe, a budget-based employment contract can be 
Pareto superior to fixed pay, because budget-based compensation could 
motivate more effort from the employee. However, a potential drawback of 
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budget-based schemes is that they impose risk on the employee, since job 
performance may be affected by factors beyond the employee's control. Thus, 
whether to choose a budget-based compensation scheme is a balance between 
the degree of motivation of risk-sharing. 
For purpose of this study, compensation schemes are classified as behaviour-
based (f ixed salary )，output-based ( similar to "budget-based" discussed 
above )’ or, as in most cases, some combination of both. A behaviour-based 
compensation plan is defined as compensating managers for devoting time to 
activities desired by top management and behaving according to their 
expectations. This kind of reward package depends on a manager's rank, title 
or position within an organization. While, the output-based compensation plan 
is usually expressed in accounting numbers ( e.g., sales commission as a 
percentage of sales revenue ) and more directly associated with manager's 
performance. This type of reward package is thus contingent on meeting the 
performance standard. And, it may be ineffective in motivating managers to 
engage in activities that are desired by top management but not directly linked 
to manager's output. 
In reality, organizations use combinations of varying degrees of behaviour-
based and output-based compensation schemes. So, what determines these 
varying degrees? The following section of this chapter will introduce one 
environmental variable, one organizational variable and one control mechanism 
to examine their individual and interactive effects on the determination of the 
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varying degrees of behaviour-based and output-based compensation scheme. 
Environmental Variable 
A major feature of management accounting research has been the attempt to 
explain the occurrence of particular types of accounting control systems by 
examining the relationship between aspects of control system design and 
organizational circumstances. Contingency Theory has become a vogue in 
management accounting research and its conceptual root lies in the idea that 
organizational effectiveness depends significantly upon the existence of a 
match between the organization and its environment. Such a contingency 
perspective on organization originated in the empirical studies of Woodward 
[1958], Burns and Stalker [1961] and Chandler [1962] and has since been 
reinforced and extended by Thompson [1967], Lawrence and Lorsch [1967], 
Becker and Neuhauser [1975] and others. 
Within the several environmental variables, Environmental Uncertaintyhas been 
recognized as an important contingent variable for the design of organizational 
control systems. Studies have linked this variable to the design of management 
accounting system [Gordon and Narayana, 1984] and to the way in which 
managers are evaluated and rewarded by their superiors [Govindarajan, 1984]. 
But no existing study has link this environmental contingency to the design of 
compensation scheme. 
According to agency theory, individuals are driven solely by self-interest. Thus, 
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from the agent's perspective, being both work-averse and risk-averse, he would 
probably prefer a more behaviour-based pay schedule which contains a high 
percentage of fixed salary, the amount of which he could be sure to get form 
the principal no matter he works hard or not and no matter the outcome of his 
work is satisfactory or not. But, form the principal's perspective, knowing the 
human nature of his agent, he would like to select a more output-based 
compensation package for two reasons: one is to motivate his agent to put 
more effort into his assigned responsibility by tying monetary reward with 
performance level, and the other is to allocate part of the risks (resulting from 
environment, technology, and etc.) to his agent. The conflict of preference over 
the type of compensation scheme between principal and agent is to be 
compromised during their bargaining process and a certain type of 
compensation package will be chosen on a mutually agreed basis. 
The environmental contingent factor may exert some weight on this bargaining 
process and further influence the final design of the agent's compensation 
scheme. When the agent perceives his operating environment ( comprising 
actions of the customers, suppliers, competitors and regulatory groups) to be 
very unstable, which means his greater effort level may be offset by 
environmental uncertainty and not necessarily lead to a better output level, he 
would be more persistent in arguing for a more behaviour=-based 
compensation package. And the reasonable result is that, the principal will 
compromise to a less output-based compensation package. When the 
environment is perceived by the agent to be quite certain and predictable, a 
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more output-based compensation schedule will be reached by the two parties 
because the agent would like to accept it due to the fact that he is sure that the 
output level is closely related to his effort level and he could maximize his utility 
by working hard! 
Proposition 1(i): 
There will be a positive correlation between perceived environmental 
uncertainty and the degree of behaviour-based compensation scheme. 
Oraanizational Variable 
Common to all principal-agent models is an information asymmetry assumption. 
The agent is assumed to have private information to which the principal cannot 
costlessly gain access. As discussed before, two types of agency problems will 
occur due to information asymmetry: moral hazard (when agent's effort level is 
not costlessly observable ) and adverse selection ( when the agent uses his 
private information for self-interest objectives). 
Numerous empirical studies have testified that information asymmetry is a very 
common phenomenon within the organizations. But the level of information 
asymmetry varies in different organizations, due to different operating 
environment and technology, sophistication and aggregation level of 
management accounting system and the organizational culture. 
When moral hazard is prevailing in the organization, the effort level of the agent 
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is not costlessly observable by the principal, which induces the agent to shirk 
or reduce his effort, the principal would likely to select a surrogate which is 
jointly observable by both parties and tend to base a hight percentage of 
compensation package upon this surrogate. Thus, an output-based 
compensation scheme is more likely to be adopted to motivate agent to exert 
optimal effort and as long as the chosen surrogate represents a fair and valid 
output measure, the agent will accept a compensation package contingent on 
that measure. 
When adverse selection prevails, the agent utilises his own private information 
to act opportunistically, the principal will resort to investing more in monitoring 
system and rewarding the agent on a more behaviour-based compensation 
scheme. But, these control strategies may result in lower levels of job 
satisfaction for the agent because he is deprived of additional rewards accruing 
from the utilization of their private information to enhance their performance. 
Thus, under this circumstance, agent will much prefer an output-based 
compensation scheme. And, principals should choose the alternative of 
investing more in monitoring, since agent's job satisfaction affect his 
performance greatly. 
On the other hand, in a relatively low information asymmetry scenario, both the 
principal and the agents have access to similar information. The agent does not 
possess private information that will materially enhance the decisions that can 
contribute to their performance. The agent knows what is expected in a 
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decision and he is aware that their common knowledge and cooperation 
contribute to the overall performance of the organization. Hence, it is 
reasonable to assume that rewards to the agents should include a higher 
amount of fixed salary. Therefore, when the level of information asymmetry is 
low within the organization, it is more likely that a more behaviour-based 
compensation scheme will be selected. 
Proposition 1(ii): 
There will be a negative correlation between the level of information 
asymmetry within the organization and the degree of behaviour-based 
compensation scheme. 
Control mechanism 
It has long been recognized by academicians that the effectiveness of any 
control mechanism depends not only on the appropriateness of its technical 
characteristics to the particular organizational and environmental circumstance 
to which it is applied, but also on the way in which organizational participants 
make use of it. The use of quantitative accounting information during the 
performance evaluation process, as a management control toll, is not an 
exception. 
In order to evaluate managerial performance, it is necessary to have some form 
of standard against which measures of performance can be assessed. Ideally, 
this involves considerations of both effectiveness (i.e., whether the manager 
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is doing the right thing) and efficiency ( le., whether he is doing what he does 
with a minimum expenditure of resources) [Otley, 1978】.However, an essential 
component of managerial work is the exercise of discretion, in that the content 
of what a manager ought to do and the way in which he ought to do it can not 
be specified in advance. Thus, for this type of activity, the most that can 
sensibly be done is to set standards for output and to determine appropriate 
schedules for the inputs that are deemed necessary for task performance. 
However, because the managerial task involves the exercise of discretion and 
judgment, the setting of standards for task performance is also an essentially 
judgmental activity [Vickers, 1965]. Therefore, the evaluation of managerial 
performance is, in itself, a managerial task which cannot be precisely 
predetermined, and which different managers will carry out in different ways. 
Accounting data may play an important role in this process, because it 
represents, to some extent, standards of both effectiveness and efficiency. 
It represents a standard of effectiveness insofar as it specifies a set of desired 
outputs deemed necessary to produce the specified outputs. Despite the fact 
that an accounting budget may not be designed primarily as a means of 
performance evaluation, there is evidence that it will almost inevitably be used 
for this purpose, whether formally sanctioned or not [Hofstede, 1968】，as it 
provides what is often the only quantitative information relating to managerial 
performance. 
Hopwood [1972] defines three distinct styles of evaluation which place varying 
degrees of emphasis on accounting information: 
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1. The budget-constrained style, which is characterised by an emphasis 
primarily on the manager's ability to continually meet the budget in the 
short term. 
2. The profit-conscious style, which bases evaluation on a manager's ability 
to increase the general effectiveness of his unit's operations in the long 
term- Accounting data play a role, but are used more flexibly and more 
cautiously than in the case of the previous style. 
3. The nonaccounting style, in which, as the name suggests, accounting 
data play a relatively unimportant role in the evaluation of a manager. 
Research work on evaluation style has been focused on its consequence on 
subordinate (including job-related tension, relations with superiors, and peer 
relations, etc.) and his behaviour ( mainly dysfunctional behaviour such as 
shirking) and hence on his overall performance [Hopwood, 1974; Otley, 1978]. 
Task uncertainty, and then environmental uncertainty, were introduced into the 
study of examining the effect of evaluation style on performance [Govindarajan, 
1984; Brownell, 1982]. But, none has ever explored the relationship between 
evaluation style and compensation scheme, though this two control 
mechanisms are closely connected. They are two integrated steps of 
performance evaluation and reward systems and both have tremendous effect 
on agent's motivation and performance. 
Logically speaking, if the accounting data plays a very important role in 
performance appraisal, which means figures like budgeted target, output level 
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and input-output ration weigh heavily in the evaluation process, reward system 
should also be directed to the result of this quantitative comparison. The 
essence of a successful performance appraisal and reward systems lies in the 
appropriate match between this two important management control tools. The 
elements which are emphasized in the performance appraisal process should 
be rewarded equally to ensure that those who are evaluated and rewarded be 
directed to improve their performance in the direction preferred by the evaluator 
and rewarder ( i.e., the principal ). Thus, an output-based compensation 
package should be connected with a budget-constrained evaluation style. And, 
when the superior adopts a comparatively subjective nonaccounting evaluation 
style, meaning that the subordinate's daily behaviour, relationship with superior 
and peers, attitude towards work and other qualitative elements instead of 
quantitative measures are emphasized during the evaluation process, a 
behaviour-based compensation scheme should be more appropriate. 
Proposition 1 (iii): 
There will be a positive correlation between the subjectiveness of 
evaluation style adopted by principals and the degree of behaviour-
based compensation scheme. 
Interactive effect 
Taken the above discussion together, it is clear that the design of compensation 
scheme is dependent on many different variables. However, the main thesis of 
this paper is that even there is a relationship between each of these variables 
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(namely, PEU, IA and ES ) arid the design of compensation scheme, the 
relationship may not be significant unless there is a joint consideration of these 
three elements implying a three-way interaction, meaning that the design of 
compensation is likely to be determined by the interaction among the level of 
PEU faced by the organization, the level of IA within the organization and the 
subjectiveness of ES adopted by principals. 
Thinking of the possible effect of IA and ES might have on the relationship 
between level of PEU and degree of behavior-based CS. With regard to the 
individual effect, high level of PEU will lead to higher degree of behavior-based 
CS. When an organization operating in a high PEU environment and at the 
same time suffering from high information asymmetry situation due to its 
business nature or the lack of a sophisticated management accounting system, 
the top management (the principal) will certainly favor a more behavior-based 
compensation package and evaluate the middle management (the agent) in 
a more subjective manner, meaning emphasizing on the qualitative measures 
such as work attitude, effort level and peer relationships. Thus, the second 
proposition is as follows: 
Proposition 2 : 
There will be an interactive effect on the degree of behaviour-based 
compensation scheme between the level of perceived environmental 
uncertainty faced by the organization, the level of information asymmetry 






Four state-owned manufacturing enterprises is Guangzhou, China were 
selected by an agent - Guangzhou Institute of Social Science. 
These enterprises are large in size ( each employing more than 1,500 
employees ) and profitable at a time when nearly 80% of the state-owned 
enterprises in PRC are losing huge amount of money, when the economy 
painfully transformed form a planned one into a market-oriented one. And the 
successfulness of these enterprises guarantees, to a great extent, the 
effectiveness of the performance evaluation practices in these organizations, 
since the biggest problem resulting the huge deficit of state-owned enterprises 
is the lack of motivation among their employees, which is closely connected 
with the performance evaluation system. 
Questionnaires (shown in appendix) were designed in Chinese and faxed to 
Guangzhou and distributed to each of the 60 middle managers (e.g., those in 
charge of the operation of certain work shops, or heads of a certain department 
)selected in that four enterprises (15 in each ) by the agent. Then, I went to 
Guangzhou to collect all the responses from the agent, who had already 
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collected each of the questionnaires personally form the 60 respondents. Of 
these 60 responses, 4 left several important questions unanswered and thus 
56 questionnaires were used in the final analysis. 
Research Design 
The measurement constructs for the variables in the questionnaire were 
developed from existing studies to enhance the validity and reliability of the 
variable measures. The response were measured using a Likert-type scale. The 
subsequent sub-sections discuss the measurements of the variables. 
Perceived Environmental Uncertainty 
This study focuses on managers' ( agents') perceptions of the uncertainty in 
their task environment rather than on any objective measures of such 
uncertainty. This approach is consistent with the empirical studies of Dill [1958], 
Lawrence and Lorsch [1967], and Duncan [1972] as well as with the conceptual 
arguments of Weick [1969], Downey and Slocum [1975], and Downey et al. 
[1975]. This group of researchers views environment as a source of information 
and argues that it is the managers' perceptions of this information which affect 
their behaviour. 
The instrument used to measure PEU is similar to the one developed by Miles 
and Snow [1978]. Respondents were asked to indicate on a 7-point Linkert 
scale (varying from "highly predictable" to "highly unpredictable") as to how 
predictable or unpredictable each of the following factors was in the context of 
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their business unit: manufacturing technology, competitors' actions, market 
demand, product attributes/design, raw material availability, raw material price 
and government regulation. 
The question on the predictability of labour union actions is excluded in this 
study because in the setting of PRC state-owned enterprise, labour union is 
totally different concept and organization from the capitalist system. Everybody 
in the enterprise is automatically a member of the labour union of that 
enterprise, and though it is said to be organized the welfare of its members, 
whenever there is conflict between the "carders" (the name of managers in 
PRC ) and workers, the labour union will stand by the "carders". 
Information Asymmetry 
IA is measured using a scale developed by Dunk [1991]. The scale was 
developed based on the definition of information asymmetry and discussions 
in the literature which indicated the situations where information asymmetry 
might be present [Chow, 1983; Waller and Chow, 1985]. Respondents were 
asked to indicate on a 7-point Likert scale as to how asymmetrically each of the 
following information regarding the subordinate's area of responsibility were 
distributed in the organization: activities undertaken, input-output relationships, 
performance potential, technical detail, impact of external factors, and 
achievable outcome. A response scale of (1) to any item indicates that the 
superior has more information and a response scale of (7) indicates that the 
subordinate has more information than the superior. A score of (4) indicates 
22 
that the superior and the subordinate had the same level of information. 
Evaluation Style 
ES is measured by adopting a slightly different version of the instrument 
developed by Otley [1978]. The crucial point concerns the way in which a 
manager perceives the budget to be used in evaluating his performance, in 
relation to other relevant information. Respondents were asked to rank three 
items they considered most important when their superiors were evaluating their 
performance, from the eight items listed on the questionnaire: 
a) the effort you put into your job; 
b) how much profit you make; 
c) your concern with quality; 
d) how well you meet your budget; 
e) the relationship you have established with your staff and men; 
f) how efficiently you run your unit; 
g) your attitude toward your work; 
h) how well you get on with your superior. 
On the basis of the rankings, three types of evaluative styles are defined: 
1. Budget-constrained style: item d) ranked among the top three criteria. 
2. Profit-constrained style: item f) but not d) ranked among the top three 
criteria. 




In this study, the variable CS is measured in terms of the extent a behaviour-
based compensation scheme is used in the organization. Behaviour-based 
compensation scheme is preferred over output-based one because it is easier 
to administer [Hongren and Foster, 1987]. A measure of the behaviour-based 
compensation scheme is derived from the basic salary portion of the 
compensation package received by a manager. The larger the salary portion, 
the more behaviour-based it is. 
The construct for measuring CS in this study is an instrument developed from 
the one used by Gul and Chia [1992] to adapt it to the Chinese setting. 
Respondents were requested to identify the amount of their basic salary (that 
is, the portion of CS which is considered to be behaviour-based) in percentage 
terms, relative to the overall compensation package which they received. The 
overall compensation package was the quantifiable amount of monetary 
rewards received by a respondent for his effort. 
The items comprising the breakdown of the annual compensation package were 
as follows: "fixed salary" (including basic salary and all governmental, regional, 
and other special allowances, which are fixed and guaranteed in China )， 
"bonus/commissions" (the volume directly dependent on job performance or 
organizational performance ) and "other income" ( including all the other 
monetary income brought by the job). The third component were listed in the 
questionnaire for the sake of Chinese setting. In PRC, it is common practice 
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that a person receives not-reported or even under-table monetary reward due 
to the position he held. 
The "fixed salary" forms the behaviour-based portion of compensation scheme 
because managers receive that ceratin amount no matter how he does his job. 
The other items are grouped under the output-based portion, because they are 




Factor analysis was performed to test for construct ( variable ) validity 
[Kerlinger, 1964; Chenhall and Morris, 1986]. The internal reliability for the 
variables was computed, single and multiple regression equations were 
analyzed. The result from (i) factor analysis of the data for validity, (ii) 
computation of the Cronbach alpha statistics for internal reliability of the 
variables, (iii) descriptive statistics of the variables, and (iv) tests of hypotheses 
for individual and interaction effects are presented in the respective tables. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for the variables. The Kaiser-Meyer-
Olkin measure of sampling adequacy (MSA) [Kaiser and Rice, 1974] values for 
the various variable range from 0.63 for information asymmetry to 0.67 for 
perceived environmental uncertainty. These results provide evidence to the 
extent of which the items of a variable belong together, thereby rendering the 
set of data appropriate for factor analysis. The MSA values provide the validity 
of the measurement constructs for the various variables. Satisfactory internal 
reliability for the variables was achieved as reflected by the Cronbach alpha 
statistics reported in Table 1 • 
26 
TABLE 1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Variables Mean Standard MSA Cronbach Alpha 
Deviation Values Coefficient 
Perceived 
Environmental Uncertainty 3.51 1.06 0.67 o.68 
Information Asymmetry 5.11 1.22 0.63 0.72 
Subjectiveness of 
Evaluation Style 2.60 0.62 - " 
Behaviour-based 
Compensation Scheme 0.44 0.10 - --
: No MSA or Cronbach Alpha values because they are single item measurements. 
Simple Regression Models 
Proposition 1 indicates that the dependent variable CS is a function of PEU’ IA 
and ES, respectively. This can be mathematically reflected in the following 
equations: 
Y = + …-Equation (1i) 
Y = i2 + ap^ Equation (1ii) 
Y = j3 + a3X3 Equation (1iii) 
where 
Y = dependent variable of behaviour-based compensation scheme; 
i = intercepts; 
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a = regression coefficients; 
X^ = independent variable of level of PEU; 
& = independent variable of level of IA; 
X3 = independent variable of degree of subjectiveness of ES. 
Multiplicative Model 
Proposition 2 indicates that the dependent variable is a function of the 
interaction of the other three variables； This could be mathematically reflected 
in Equation (2): 
Y = + a1X1 + agXg + a3X3 + b,X,X2 + + b 3 X ^ + c ^ . X ^ 
—-Equation (2) where 
Y = dependent variable of behaviour-based 
CS; 
i1 = intercept; 
a,b’c = regression coefficients; 
X ” X2, and X3 = the independent variables (PEU, IA, ES); 
X ^ , X^g, XgXg, X ^ X g = the interaction terms. 
The term "interaction" is used as in regression analysis where the dependent 
variable is specified and the interaction is the cross-product term "... as 
occurring between independent variables in their effect on the dependent 
variable" [Althauser, 1971; Allison, 1977; Southwood, 1978; Schoonhoven, 
1981], A significant value for the unstandardized regression coefficient q in 
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Equation (2) would support proposition 2. Two issues should be noted in 
interpreting the results of testing Equation (2) because of the interval scale data 
used for measuring the variables. First, as demonstrated by Southwood [1978] 
and Govindarajan and Fisher [1990], except for the term cv the beta 
coefficients in Equation (2) are not interpretable since they can be altered by 
shifting the origin points of X ” X2, and X3. Second, particularly when interval 
scales are used, multicollinearity is not a problem since such multicollinearity 
can be completely eliminated by manipulating the origin points for X ” X2, and 
X3 and reducing R2 for the regression equation between X ^ ^ (the dependent 
variable) and X” X2, X3, X ^ , X1X3J and X ^ (the independent variables) to 
zero. Such a transformation of the origin points for X1? X2, and X3 does not in 
any way affect the values or the significance of c1 in Equation (2) [Govindarajan 
and Fisher, 1990]. 
Equation (2) is a sufficient test for proposition 2 but provides no information on 
whether the posited relationships are monotonic or not. Such information can 
be obtained by examining the partial derivative from the larger regression 
equation, that is, Equation (2)., This would determine if a nonmonotonic or 
symmetrical effect was present. 
It has been argued above that the different levels of environmental uncertainty 
perceived by middle management will lead to different degree of behavior-
based compensation scheme. It is also reasonable to consider the possible 
effect of the organizational variable IA and the evaluation style adopted by top 
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management in performance evaluation on this relationship. Given this 
perspective, I fixed Y^ (the level of IA) and then examined the interaction 
between ( the level of PEU) and X3 ( the degree of subjectiveness of 
evaluation style )• For a fixed X^ the interaction term, if significant can be 
interpreted as changing the coefficients of X! or X3. The assumptions about 
causality that are made determine the choice between these two variables. 
Mathematically, both approaches are equally valid. I chose to study the partial 
derivative of X3, but results are the same if X! is selected. Therefore, the partial 
derivative of Equation (2) with respect to X3 is shown as Equation (3) below: 
dY/dX3 = a3 + b ^ , + b3X2 + Equation ⑶ 
If X2 (IA) is a constant, Equation (3) can be rewritten as 
ay/dX3 = ( a3 + b3X2) + ( b2 + 0^2 ) X1 Equation (4) 
If the value of aY/aX in Equation (4) is always positive or always negative over 
the entire observable range of Xv the relationship between Y and X3, given a 
fixed value of Xg, would be regarded as monotonic; otherwise, it would be 
regarded as nonmonotonic. The existence of nonmonotonic effects could 
provide information on where in the range of the variables ( in the case, X^ 




Single Regression Models 
For the three single regression models, significant correlation was only found 
between the level of perceived environmental uncertainty and the degree of 
behaviour-based compensation scheme, supporting proposition 1(i), but the 
coefficient is very small -- 0.023. 
The result shows very weak, if any, support for the proposition that PEU, IA or 
ES individually has a significant effect on the design of compensation scheme. 
Multiplicative Model 
Table 2 provides the results of the multiple regression models performed to test 
proposition 2. In the table, Equation A is the result of the regression on the 
level of PEU, the level of IA, the degree of subjectiveness of ES, and the 
interactions of PEU and I A, PEU and ES, and IA and ES. Following the earlier 
reasoning I expected that three-way interaction would not only be a significant 
but also add significantly to the predictive ability of the model in terms of the R2. 
Equation B is the result of the regression on Equation A and the inclusion of the 
three-way interaction of PEU, IA and ES. 
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TABLE 2 RESULTS OF MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS FOR 
BEHAVIOUR-BASED COMPENSATION SCHEME * 
Variables Equation A Prob>Tfor Equation B Prob>T for 
Equation A Equation B 
PEU 0.009 0.9060 1.124 0.0020 
(0.078) (0.345) 
IA -0.067 0.4270 0.677 0.0064 
(0.083) (0.237) 
ES (subjectiveness) -0.152 0.3165 1.244 0.0074 
(0.151) (0.444) 
PEU * IA -0.001 0.9178 -0.212 0.0019 
(0.011) (0.064) 
PEU * ES 0.008 0.7502 -0.391 0.0025 
(0.024) (0.122) j 
|A*ES 0.022 0.3886 -0.240 0.0055 
(0.025) (0.082) 
PEU * IA * ES 0.075 0.0018 
(0.023) 
R2 8.95% 25.84% 
F value 0.803 0.5724 2.389 0.0352 j 
R2 explained by significant 3-way interaction term = 16.89% 
* N=56. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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From the result of the Equation B in the above table, the regression coefficient 
for the three-way interaction term is positive and significant. The introduction 
of the interaction term results in a significant increase in R2 or the variance in 
behaviour-based CS explained for the regression equation. The significant 
result provides support for the presence of a three-way interaction between the 
level of PEU faced by the organization, the level of IA within the organization, 
and the degree of subjectiveness of ES as suggested in proposition 2. In 
interpreting the result an important issue should be put forward. Two-way 
interactions in Equation A yielded no significant result suggesting that the 
consideration of any two of the independent variables were not important in 
terms of predictive ability. It was only when the three-way interaction term was 
introduced in Equation B that the model was significant and the interaction was 
also significant. 
From Table 2, the partial derivatives of Equation B give the following result: 
dY/aXg = 1.24 - 0.39X1 - 0.24X2 + 0.07X^2 一- Equation (5) 
The effect on the degree of behaviour-based CS of changing the degree of 
subjectiveness of ES is a function of the level of PEU (X^ and level of IA (Xg). 
In order to analyze the relationship for an organization operating in a hight IA 
state, I selected the extreme higher end value for perceived information 
asymmetry, setting it to 7. Equation (5) can then be expressed as follows: 
dY/dX3 = -0.44 + 0.1X! -…Equation (5i) when IA=7 
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When Equation (5i) is at zero, the inflection point is 4.4 for PEU, which is within 
the range of the observable value for X^ The point of inflection indicates where 
the change in the direction of the slope occurs. Equation (5i) will be positive ( 
negative) when the X t has a value above ( below ) the point of inflection. 
Therefore, for organizations operating in high IA and high PEU situations, high 
degree of subjectiveness in performance evaluation is associated with high 
degree of behaviour-based compensation scheme. 
To calculate the interaction of the level of PEU and degree of subjectiveness 
of ES on the design of CS for organizations operating in a low level of IA state, 
I selected the extreme lower end value for information asymmetry, setting to 4. 
Equation (5) can then be expressed as follows: 
aY/dX3 = 0.28 - 0 . 1 E q u a t i o n (5ii) when IA=4 
When Equation (5ii) is at zero, the point of inflection is 2.5 for PEU level, which 
is within the range of the observable values for X” As in the earlier case, the 
point of inflection indicates where the change in the direction of the slope 
occurs. Equation (5ii) will be negative ( positive ) when the X^  has a value 
above (below) the point of inflection. Therefore, for organizations having low 
IA and operating in a high level of PEU circumstances, high degree of 




DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Discussion of Results 
This paper is not a strict agency study jn the sense that I have not reduced the 
relationships and propositions to mathematical abstractions with a view of 
discovering Pareto-optimal incentive schemes. Rather, I derive some general 
propositions based on the principal-agent branch of agency theory and test 
these propositions in afield setting. It therefore provides some empirical validity 
of the underlying notions of principal-agent theory in managerial accounting. 
The results of this study suggest that the effects of perceived environmental 
uncertainty on the design of middle management's compensation scheme is 
different depending on the level of information asymmetry between middle 
management and top management and the way top management evaluates 
middle management. In other wprds, when the organization operates in a high 
information asymmetry situation, with the top management evaluate middle 
management's performance in a quite subjective manner, a high level of 
perceived environmental uncertainty may lead to the design of a more 
behaviour-based compensation scheme, while when the information asymmetry 
problem is not severe inside an organization ( which means both the top 
management and middle management have the same access to any relevant 
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information), and the top management again takes a subjective evaluative style, 
high level of perceived environmental uncertainty will lead to a lower degree of 
behavior-based compensation scheme. Despite the underlying theory suggests 
individual effect of each independent variables on the design of compensation 
scheme, the results show that such relationships are either insignificant or 
weak. 
The biggest limitation of this study is the lack of a variable measuring the 
organizational effectiveness. Though existing studies have good questionnaire 
design in testing organizational effectiveness, mainly by self-rated performance 
in each functional areas including planning, coordinating, supervising, etc. Due 
to the special setting in PRC, where managers have very little knowledge of the 
concept of "management" used in the western text books which makes 
respondents difficult to understand the functional areas specified in the 
questionnaire, I chose another way to solve this problem. As I mentioned 
before, successful enterprises were chosen for the sake of guarantee, to some 
extent, organizational effectiveness. 
With such a small sample size, any generalization of the results to other 
settings and populations should be viewed with caution. 
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Conclusion 
In broad terms I may say that the results of studies such as this may provide 
a basis for evaluating the potential of the principal-agency model as the 
foundation for a rigorous normative theory of management accounting. A 
number of propositions were developed derived from the extant agency 
literature. The propositions were tested using a model which incorporated one 
environmental variable, one organizational variable and two control 
mechanisms. Three propositions were tested to evaluate the individual effect 
of the three independent variables on the dependent variable and one 
proposition was tested to evaluate the interaction effects (three-way interaction 
)of these variables on the dependent variable. The results of the study support 
for the interactive effects. 
From an agency theory perspective, organizational designers will benefit from 
being aware of the need to adopt an integrated approach towards designing the 
overall control system in organizations. This integrated approach could be 
achieved by considering the interaction effects between the level of PEU, the 
level of IA and the evaluation style adopted in the performance evaluation 
process on the design of compensation scheme. Being aware of the interaction 
relationships between the variables enables the organizational designer to 
identify those feasible sets that are appropriate to meet different contingencies 
and also to understand the internal consistency of the control subsystems 
necessary to enhance organizational effectiveness. 
APPENDIX 1 
English Version of the Questionnaire 
Part A; Perceived Environmental Uncertainty 
Please indicate your ability to predict the effects on your company of changes in the variables shown below by the number 
which best reflects your view. 
Highly Highly 
Predictable Unpredictable 
a. Manufacturing technology 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
b. Competitors' actions 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
c. Market demand 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
d. Product attributes/design 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
e. Raw materials availability 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
f. Raw materials price 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
g. Government regulations 1 2 . 3 4 5 6 7 
Part B: Information Asymmetry Measure 
Please respond to each of the following questions by circling a number from 1 to 7, basing on their individual scales. 
1. In comparison with your superior，who is In possession of better Information regarding the activities undertaken 
in your area of responsibility? 
My superior has We have about I have 
much better the same quality much better 
information of information information 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. In comparison with your superior, who is more familiar with the input-output relationships inherent in the 
internal operations of your area of responsibility? 
My superror is much We are about I am much 
more familiar equally familiar more familiar 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. In comparison with your superior, who is more certain of the performance potential of your area of 
responsibility? 
My superior is much We are about I am much 
more certain equally certain more certain 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. In comparison with your superior, who Is more familiar technkaUy with the work of your area of 
responsibility? 
My superior Is much We are about I am much 
more familiar equally familiar more familiar 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. In comparison with your superior, who is more abk to assess the potential Impact on your activities of factors 
external to your area of responsibility? 
My superior Is much We are about I am much 
more able equally able more able 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. In comparison with your superior，who has a better understanding of what can be achieved In your area of 
responsibility? 
My superior has We have about I have 
a much better the same a much better 
understanding understanding understanding 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Part C: Evaluative Style 
What do you think your superior count for most in evaluating your performance? Please choose the 3 most important 
measures from the listed eight items. 
a. the effort I put into my job 
b. how much profit I make 
c. my concern with quality 
d. how well I meet my budget 
e. the relationships I have established with my staff and men 
f. how efficiently I run my unit 
g. my attitude toward my work 
f. how well I get on with group staff 
Part D: Compensation Scheme 
Your current annual compensation package Is proportionately as follows: 
Fixed Salaiy % 
(including basic salary and other governmental allowances) 
Bonus/Commission % 
(dependent on job performance) 
Other Income % 
(including all the other monetary Income brought by the job) 
100 % 
APPENDIX 2 
Chinese Version of the Questionnaire 






11.生产技术： 1 2 3 4 5 6 
完全不可预铡 完全可以预#J 
12.竞争者的行动： 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I 完全不可预镧 芫全可以预铡 
1.3 •市场需求： 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
_ 完全不可预铡 完全可以预铡 
14•产品设计： 1 2 3 4 • 5 6 7 
I 完全不可预测 完全可以预铡 
I 5 •康材料供应； 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 
I 完全不可预镧 完全可以预测 
I 6-康材料价榣： 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
• 完全不可预测 完全可以预_ J 
§7•政府有关法规： 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 





I 1 •对于你责任范围内的具体工作，谁知II得更清楚？ 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
| 我上级更清楚 不相上下 我自己更清楚 
1 2,对于你责任范围内的工作量投入与工作成果之同的比例关系，谁更熟悉？ 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
J 我上级更熟悉 不相上下 我自己更熟悉 
I 3.对于你负责的工作所可能达到的•在成缋，谁知逭得吏确切？ 
“ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
t卜级审猫±11 不相上下 》自己更确切 
I 
4.谁萸熟悉你所负赍的工作的技术性细节？ 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
我上级更熟悉 不栢上下 我自己更熟悉 
5.谁吏有能力评价外来因素对你所负责的工作所可能产生的影响？ 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
我上级更有能力 不栢上下 我自己更有能力 
6.谁荑了解你负责的工作所可能达到的成就？ 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
我上级更了解 不栢上下 t自己更了解 
||下面列举了八个评蚧工作表现的项g，你觉得你的直赉上級在评价你的工作时更注重哪些方面？ 
I请你按顺序列举出你的上级最注重的三个项目、 
I 编号 内苕 
| l ， 你是否努力工作 
|| 2 , 你5责鈴钛门或车同的蓄利情況的好坏 
i 3 • 你是否关心产&质量 
1 4 . 你是否完成预篝 
lk： 鍵籠•養纖架•用 
1 1 7• 你对工作的态度如何 
I 8 * 你和你的上级关系如何 
_请按重受住列出三条最重受的项目的绢号；最重旻的 ？ 第 二 重 旻 第 三 重 旻 
；I第四部分 
I 假设你的每年的总收入为10 0%,那么你的收入中國定收入占多大比例，奖金占多大比例？ 
I 请按实际情況在下面空榣里填上栢应的百分点： 
1 组成部分 百分比’ 
1 固定收入 





I 总额 100% 
I 附 录 ： 个 人 资 料 
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